Bridge Watchkeeping Practices

It would be good to scratch below the surface with regard to few Bridge watchkeeping practices, some of which are detrimental to keeping of safe lookout or even to obtaining early warning of approaching targets.

Often, one finds the radars set up incorrectly. One sees both radars fixed on a particular range scale, usually 12 nm and 6 nm scales, with target vectors and trails both set on True mode. I have seen even some senior OOWs opting to go with this preference. If the relieving OOW does not challenge it upon taking over watch,then we are looking at more of the same. Innocuous as it seems, what is the potential of harm in this? 

Target vector needs to be on Relative mode, and trails on True. While evaluating risk of collision,this gives the OOW an instant appreciation of evolving situation.One might argue that radar is required to have a button to switch vectors from Relative to True, and vice versa, with a single action. This is correct. But only if it is being used systematically, instead of some random interval such as,say, once in 15 or 20 mins. 

Likewise, whether in open waters or in busy traffic waters, to leave radars on fixed range scales is to miss approaching targets that lie outside the scale in use completely! By merely switching the radar to,say,24-nm off-centred display, the OOW gets a truly early warning. 

If we do not monitor the dynamic situation as it unfolds, we are in breach of COLREGS 5,7a,7b, 7c.

Visual lookout - which is perhaps the single most important collison-avoidance tool - can occasionally suffer due to OOWs watchkeeping position being firmly rooted near the ECDIS and the nearest radar, to the exclusion of all else. 

One wasn't surprised to read when a noteworthy statistic emerged from the MAIB's investigations a few years ago : IT WAS FOUND THAT IN 43% OF COLLISION CASES THE OOW WAS EITHER COMPLETELY UNWAWARE OF THE TARGET UPTO THE POINT OF COLLISION, OR ONLY BECAME AWARE WHEN IT WAS TOO LATE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO AVOID COLLISION.

Keeping targets visually sighted is vital. CHANGE IN ASPECT IS MOST READILY APPARENT TO THE HUMAN EYE, BEFORE IT IS TO AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE,SUCH AS AIS OR ARPA, IF TARGET STARTS TO ALTER COURSE. In a close range situation, few seconds of delay in taking correct avoiding action can result in a dangerous situation, as most OOWs know.

Lookout is a shared responsibility but presence of AB on Bridge does not relieve the OOW of his own singular duty to keep proper lookout. OVER TIME, MOST COMPETENT SEAFARERS WILL DEVELOP AN INTUITIVE SENSE OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN CLOSE QUARTERS OR CAUSE A HAZARDOUS SITUATION TO BUILD UP. TOGETHER WITH USING ALL OTHER MEANS TO ASSESS RISK OF COLLISON OR GROUNDING, THIS MAKES FOR THE HIGHEST SKILL A OOW HAS IN HIS REPERTOIRE OF SKILLS !

Simple radar settings,too,can sometimes be terribly skewed. On several occasions I have found the OOW unaware of what the settings are. In one case recently - and this was a senior officer - I found that clutter suppression had been turned up in heavy rain (nothing wrong with that, as long as it is commensurate with prevailing conditions) but the gain control was turned down. This officer had mentioned to me that the radar was 'missing' targets, when I came up on the Bridge. And when proper adjustments were made to the picture, few targets showed up at close range.The OOW explained that he had turned down gain to reduce interference on the diplay!

Weather Routing : shouldn't the advisories be getting better?

Shipmasters who have used shore-based weather routing advice for over two decades might agree when I say that there is perhaps a deterioration in standards in the past few years. I'm not quite sure why. Of course, this requires the shipmaster to be less reliant on merely one source of prediction,and to make his own diligent study of evolving conditions.

Having worked the north-Pacific and north-Atlantic ocean routes over several years, esp during winters, I find that the rapid evolution of climate-change induced meteorological conditions is also creating some sort of a gap between what is predicted and what is encountered. This is puzzling because as time goes by, weather prediction algorithms - on which the prognosis and extended outlook are based -  would have surely improved immensely, so why is the advisory service not keeping pace? 

Does it have something to do with who exactly is interpreting data, is it a senior analyst or marine professional with several years of interpreting and disseminating routing advice, or is it a less-experienced analyst who is sending you the advice? Which comes down to training and competence of shore-based analysts. This could be a plausible reason.

Owners should ask specific questions of routing service providers to gather information about the methodology that backs their advisories. Invite some of their representatives for the occasional interaction with seafarers, this might help. But performance feedback of weather routing service providers needs to be elicited and acted upon. After all, this is a paid service!

Container vessels trading between China-US across Pacific are currently crossing eastbound in about 2 weeks, and westbound in about 2-4 weeks, depending upon just-in-time and inventory requirements.I have found the preliminary voyage routing (advisory #1) to be so predictable in the past 5-6 years - at times it appears very little consideration has been given to weather beyond 2-3 days! This results in voyage deviations and resultant much higher fuel consumption and longer distance than originally envisaged.

On the vessel side, the Bridge Team need to step up their game and monitor as many sources as we possibly can when crossing the ocean. In the Sino-Japanese basin, one has found the JMA website extremely useful,with its hourly updates during stormy weather. The free radio-fax charts from NOAA continue to be an excellent resource, having provided valuable service to mariners for over 15 years on both the USEC and USWC.

Berthing Very Large Container Vessels

Use of tugs for berthing and unberthing very large container vessels is a high precision job,requiring deep appreciation of all the factors that influence these vessels and complete synergy between all members of the Bridge Team. Every manoeuvre is unique, even ones that are at the same berth with same vessel or class of vessels and same meteorological conditions.

Available tug power and ultra dead-slow speed of approach contribute significantly to berthing or unberthing these vessels successfully while ensuring the risk of damage to vessel and/or pier or cranes is reduced to zero. Setting up the ECDIS correctly, interpreting doppler log data intelligently, recognising when the data is unreliable, UKC, turning room in the basin and - if the turn is to be executed in a river with current - downstream drift while turning, the port's past experience and simulated turning times for such manoeuvres for different vessel types and sizes, are just a few amongst a plethora of factors that need to be kept in mind when assessing risks. Every port has data on time taken to turn vessels of different types and sizes through,say, 180 degrees under different conditions.This is extremely valuable information, and if made available to the shipmaster, contributes hugely to the safety of manoeuvre. Combining all this with the watchful alertness of the Bridge Team raises the safety bar.

Ideally, a speed of landing on the fenders at berth of < 0.1 kts is preferred, but occasionally this can be higher.Under worse case scenarios, sufficient kinetic energy is transferred to cause great harm to assets.

Inadequate tug power and insufficient number of tugs can often be a hidden culprit in this error chain.

I received excellent guidance from a friendly senior pilot once, which I have summarised below. The rule of thumb used in some key regions (and ports) around the world - as per this information - is as below :

Europoort (Holland)  :

Total tug power (in tonnes) =  Vessel displacement / 3000

Japan :

Total tug horsepower = Vessel displacement / 10

Total tug power (in tonnes) =  { (Vessel displacement x 60) / 100000 } + 40 

Sweden  :

Tug horsepower per 1000 m2 wind area in tons =  v2 / 18  (where 'v' is wind speed in m/s)

Tug power (in tonnes) = {wind area x v2} / (1000 x 18).

It was mentioned that the Swedish formulae takes the freeboard into account in the calculation and is the easiest to use. It was pointed out that there can be a large variance from port to port. (Author's opinion :  above guidance is a good tool in the Master's armoury when arriving at a decision regarding total tug power to order).

This beneficial information was further supplemented with a handy 'conversion'  factor from tug engine power to bollard pull, something that is not readily available to the shipmaster and I hope it will help us all : 

Bollard pull of tug (in tonnes) =  (Engine power in kW / 74 kW) x constant. The constant given for each type of tug is :

Propeller type / constant :

Ordinary propeller / 1.3

Nozzle / 1.6

Voith Schneider / 1.0

The shipmaster must, of course, bear in mind that 100% tug power may not be available,being influenced by various factors itself,not least amongst them the tug's own speed and that of the vessel.

Source  :  text in italics made available by a senior marine pilot in Port Klang,Malaysia.

Transiting the Malacca Straits : Voluntary Speed Reduction

Shipping volumes through the Malacca Straits seem to have grown bigger in the last decade,with each passing year introducing larger vessels into the fray.Combine this with new land  being reclaimed in some of the busiest parts of the Singapore Straits,and the consequent effect on strength of tidal streams, the safety margin required for larger ships to call at the primary pilot boarding grounds or even transiting through the busiest sectors appears to have shrunk, multiplying the risks of navigational incidents. There are currently no speed restrictions imposed by the VTS which, given the volume and diversity of traffic, makes for a often chaotic transit at choke points.

There is a strong case now for imposing a speed limit on all vessels transiting the Singapore Straits. Large vessels pack tremendous momentum and the potential for harm is enormous should there be a contact with external object.

It would be prudent to observe a self-imposed NO-OVERTAKING rule between,say, the Brothers Islands at the western side of the Singapore Straits and the Horsburgh Light House on the eastern side. Of course, this requires one to reduce speed below 11 kts and keep engines ready for instant manoeuvring to drop down further, if the situation demands. This does not result in any delays,raises the safety bar exponentially, throws a protective cordon around the vessel and demonstrates due diligence on the part of vessels voluntarily complying with such a speed restriction.

I have followed this self-imposed rule these past 8-10 years and found it to be effective in avoiding close-quarters situations.

One can argue that COLREGS already stipulate proceeding at a Safe Speed commensurate with traffic density, etc but it is quite common-place to see vessels speeding at 15-18 kts,undoubtedly oblivious to the risk that this poses to safety in some of the busiest sectors of traffic convergence.

The interpretation of Rule 6 has to be pre-emptive, not reactive.Safe Speed in bottleneck areas must not rely on an individual's percetion of risk, but rather should be clearly defined and consistently implemented.

How dynamic is your Voyage Passage Plan?

Prior embarking on a voyage, it is necessary to have a sound Passage Plan which takes into account elements of good voyage planning to guard against all risks a vessel is likely to be exposed to. Anybody reading this piece probably already knows that. 

But how relevant your current Passage Plan truly is?

A Passage Plan, besides incorporating Company's SMS and Best Practices laid down in industry publications, should equally importantly include the collective experience of all Bridge Watchkeepers and vessel's past experience of the same trade. This, of course, requires that the Plan should have been updated at every leg of the previous voyage as it was being executed with information that is relevant for future recall. All Bridge watchkeepers' contribution to the continuous improvement of a Passage Plan is vital. The Bridge Team's keen observation during pilotage, coastal and ocean legs - and careful jottings in the remarks section of the Plan as the voyage is unfolding - is at the core of this processs, eg during pilotage waters, excellent local knowledge can be picked up from the pilot.

Passage Plans are not only vital towards safe execution and conclusion of the voyage, they are also the subject of close scrutiny from PSC officials and auditors. A closer look at the Plan would, however, reveal that nearly all previous versions of the Plan are almost exactly the same as the current one, simply printed after minor changes in voyage details and put into use. This also has the potential of leading to single person errors going undetected, particularly in the absence of a closer review by each member of the Bridge Team.

Masters - and even auditors - have a responsibility to not only ensure this crucial document accurately covers the voyage that is to commence, but also it has been dynamically updated to mirror the voyage just gone by. If merely by studying a Passage Plan for a well-executed voyage gone by we can take home valuable learning tips to prepare and improve a future Plan, then the ISM goal has been well-served.  

Your Work,Your Signature

I recently had a messman in my shipboard team whose work and attitude often led me to reflect upon the quality that some of us possess which makes us stand out taller than the rest. It amazed me that, despite the routine nature of the job and long contract period, here he was turning out day after day with an infectious smile ever-ready to be shared with his colleagues, performing his work with a remarkable zest.

It was quite clear to me within the first few weeks of observing him at work that here was a youngster who was cut out for bigger things in life.

His typical workday, as anybody's in that rank, required him to attend to galley and pantry duties besides attending to meal service for officers and crew in the messrooms thrice a day. During other times it was customary to see him scurrying along to complete his routine cleanship duties in the officers' cabins,washing and ironing linen, changing table linen in the messroom - even when it had the smallest stain - completely unsupervised, noticeably perspiring at times due to the speed and alacrity with which he preferred to do his job. And all this with a cheerful countenance and a palpable pride while executing his duties.

He was an excellent baker, dishing out amazing confectionery items and desserts, something that was way above his job responsibilties. Fruits were often presented on the table adorned with his signature cuts or dressing.

Fruit ahoy!

       

Shipboard parties, where the workload was higher due to the variety of foods and accompaniments that had to be served up, brought out the best in him. He would exceed his own high standards on such occasions! 

It struck me that other members of the shipboard team had a lesson or two to learn from such a colleague.Performing work way above the standard expected of you is not just a matter of competence.Its about the pleasure you derive from doing the same job clearly better in quality than the rest.Its about the price you put on each task, notwithstanding how mundane or menial.This becomes your signature.

Efficiency of operations and time constraints often mean that perfection can be sacrificed.I really found it so heartening to see a member of the crew striving for and achieving such high perfection in his job.

Small wonder then the messman was singled out for a citation in the monthly fleet bulletin.

The Modern Seafarer

Young officers have faced some flak in the past 5-8 years for their low competence levels and lack of professionalism. But there is another aspect that has quietly crept up on us and, it seems to me, reflects how seafarers (and the composition of a shipboard team) are changing.

Some officers coming through to senior ranks cannot draft documents such as Claims, Protests, Disclaimers or other formal letters that require a bit more than elementary school knowledge of English. On the other hand, some of our Able-bodied seamen speak good English, though, equally, a number do not understand much. And since the young AB who can converse well in English probably feels he can take a shot at becoming an officer - and  many have qualified to serve as officers - the crewing gets a bit skewed in that we have a team that is not balanced, leans on one or two individuals, and is comprised of one or two part-timers who might lack even basic seamanship skills, exercise of which is the key to responding well in an emergency situation. This can lead to serious consequences if, say, a situation that demands concerted effort spins out of control.

To build expertise, one needs painstaking attention to learning from the grass-roots level. This is not possible in the present scenario of running a ship. The ship demands efficiency, which often means that thoroughness is a casualty.

So, is there a solution? For one, I guess training ashore has to be more effective to make a dent. Crew selection criteria has to be transparent and stringent. Plus, when shipowners carpet-bomb the vessel with additional training resources, they should also indicate how much time must be set aside for learning from that particular module or lesson in a dynamic shipboard environment, so that work/rest hours of crew members can be preserved.

More importantly, hiring of ever-cheaper crews as a business KPI (Key Performance Indicator) must be avoided! If next year's crew hiring costs have to reduce by 5% over this year's, then we have lost the battle for safer ships and cleaner seas already.

Business vs Quality

The shipping industry must perhaps be the only business that generates big profits making use of somewhat dubious skills. The downward slide in quality of staff, both officers and crew, since I last wrote about it, appears to be spinning out of control. One gets concerned to think what the future has in store for us when the staff that is now serving in junior ranks rises to take charge in the next few years.

Further, our employers periodically send us messages with vivid description of events that have caused seafarers to end up in jail. The underlying wisdom that governs such thinking is that the more you scare seafarers, the less inclined they will be to break rules.

This is a WRONG policy and needs to be condemned by all who go out to sea. Especially because it is an indirect admission of failure. Failure to engage seafarers with proper tools such as in-house training programmes, proper pre-joining briefing, motivating shipboard staff by addressing their genuine needs and innovative mentoring programmes rather than simply relying on older-staff-MUST-teach-the-newer-staff approach.

The Business model of shipping, where you treat crew wages as an "expense", has spelt the doom of professionalism at sea. The malady has been creeping up on us since the past 15 years and has now reached epidemic proportion.

Stop pushing more of the same down the throats of seafarers. Change tack. Combine skills of yester-years with those of today. Most of all, please STOP flogging the seafarer.


Quality cannot be beat into a seafarer, it has to be taught patiently.

The Eleventh Commandmant

Most ships still do not have a dedicated e-mailing terminal freely accessible to crews as a result of which emails have to be routed through the Master. This is an archaic and unethical way of handling private emails. It destroys all privacy and dignity desired of private communication.

In 2007, I was posted on a ship which had recently been taken over from crews of a different nationality. Posted on a wall in the radio room (they had a radio officer!) I came across this notice which had been put up by the previous Master near the email terminal.

This 'Tiger' Master no doubt had a 'firm' view of his own, bordering on the ludicrous!

Dear God, give us this day our daily bread.....

Having suffered the worst economic slowdown in living memory, shipowners are hurting bad. New buildings have skidded to a halt and the ones that see the light of day, especially amongst the worst-hit global container fleet, proceed to a "cold lay-up", a term I had never heard in over 3 decades of seafaring. What does the future hold for us seafarers?

I think we have been somewhat better off upto now (a friend said "you can moan but not complain") when compared with other professions where large scale redundancies have been the norm. The US job market stats still paint a dark picture but since April'09 the downward free-fall seems to have been arrested. So, are we seeing a economic recovery?

Well, I am writing not because I woke up this morning feeling like a top economist or a stock market analyst but simply because I wish to share a I-have-a-bad-feeling-about-this kind of thought with fellow mariners. Indian seafarers working for foreign shipowners need to look ahead and pre-empt a 2007-08 style of 'evaporation' of earnings due to a bullish rupee.

There is a growing belief that the Indian economy will grow at a fair pace in this and future years. It would be timely and thoughtful for employers to consider freezing wages of Indian seafarers in rupee terms so that they are insulated from the shock-waves of a rising rupee as it resumes climbing northwards against the dollar. This would have a good effect on morale and send a signal to seafarers that employers care. This, in turn, would help attract more youngsters into the industry. Once a freeze in wages are effected at a reasonable level, there can be some sort of a yearly allowance or increment to ensure that wages keep pace with inflation.

For, once lady Liquidity returns amongst our midst, there is likely to be rampant inflation, too. And I am not so sure the same risk-management gurus who brought honest, hard-working middle-class families to their knees in the past two years will not go and botch it up some more.

I do not understand what in hell this full convertibility of the rupee is all about nor do I care but, dear God, whenever I do convert a dollar please give me full bang for my buck.

Eyes Wide Shut!

When it comes to life-cover, disability and medical insurance, Indian seafarers as a professional group can easily qualify as the most poorly insured lot. Pariahs as we are (on terra firma), absence of any credible forum where our needs in these rapidly-changing times are genuinely debated and addressed further compounds the problem.

Indian seafarers serving under foreign flags cease to enjoy death/disability cover as soon as their tours of service end and they proceed home on leave. To maintain commensurate levels of cover whilst ashore, term policies with large premium outlay have to be purchased.

Insurance compensation for loss of life at sea or partial/total incapacitation available to a seafarer (or his next-of-kin) extends upto US$ 100,000/- or so. For incapacitation, the percentage of disability determines the quantum of compensation. These figures themselves appear to have suffered a 'freeze' for over a decade now (somebody please correct me if I am wrong) and both MUI and NUSI will render yeoman's service to seafarers, whom they represent, if these scales could be revised and reconciled with the living index in one of the world's fastest-growing economies.

Contrary to the above, the aviation industry, which has in recent years been the precursor to several training modules within the shipping industry, provides life cover and incapacitation compensation to its pilots even when they are on vacation or not flying! This is possible because pilots are covered under a Group Insurance policy. Pertinently, airline pilotage is regarded by insurance underwriters as no greater than the risks of modern living!

Having spoken to a senior LIC agent, I was given to understand that if a proposal were to be presented to their Head-Office, say, for a group of 50 seafarers, to buy life-cover for each member of the group, then any such policy would be a term insurance plan under which the individual could be provided life-cover upto a maximum age of 60 years, and depending on the age-profile of individual group members, the premium, the agent guessed wildly, for a sum assured of 50 lacs could be as low as Rs 4/- per one thousand rupees sum assured! If a seafarer can buy additional life-cover from LIC (or any other underwriter) by opting for one of their pure-term plans, one would have a decent life-cover at low cost. This is very promising and needs to be pursued by our unions working aggressively in mission-mode. WILL THEY? I'm sure there will be several hurdles in the path of any such proposal, but I do not believe these will be insurmountable. In the end, the benefits that accrue to seafarers will be immense.

Let us look at what kind of Group Insurance cover MUI does offer its members.

An officer's CoC (licence) can be insured with United India Indemnity Insurance by paying an annual fee of just Rs 200/-. The cover provides following benefits in case of a mishap :
1. Suspension of CoC : maximum compensation of Rs 64,000/- payable over 8 months.
2. Cancellation of CoC : Rs 1,20,000/- payable over 18 months.
3. Replacement with lower certificate : Rs 4,500/- pm for 8 months.
4. Legal assistance : maximum Rs 5,00,000/-.
5. Inquiry outside India : Rs 50,000/-.

Above are the maximum sums payable. Ship-type and P&I clubs with which the ship is entered would determine actual limits. These limits, once again, need to be increased significantly to restore parity with the living index. Additionally, MUI makes available a medical cover for seafarers (and their families) under various heads to recover annual medical expenses.

As a role model, the French, who rate very high on the European social security ladder, have an enviable system in place for seafarers. The affairs of mariners, including fishermen, fall under the purview of a marine administration (Affaires Maritimes), somewhat akin to the DG Shipping in India, and control issues like insurance for sailors and their families, retirement benefits, licencing, etc. There are about 20 different categories under which all seafarers are clubbed, depending on rank/type of vessel/age,etc. Let us say the Owner/Operator pays a seafarer a wage of Euro 4500/- pm. At the same time he deposits Euro 3000/- with the administration into a fund for the seafarer. The seafarer pays Euro 800/- into this fund from his wage, so that his net wage pm is Euro 3700/- (prior taxes). This is paid to him every month until he retires at age 55. Also, the mariner and his family have a social security which covers nearly 75-80% of the expenses incurred for medical consultations, hospitalisation and pharmacy. Upon retirement, the seafarer mentioned in the above category can hope to get a wage of Euro 2600/- pm (prior taxes) for the rest of his life.

It is often said that French seafarers priced themselves out of the market, like most other Western European nationals. That, perhaps, is the reason why we have fewer than 200 French vessels at sea with 3-8 French mariners onboard. And not too many French sailors can be found freelancing with other fleets before age 55!

Do Indian seafarers run similar risks of over-pricing themselves out of the market?

I'm convinced we do not.

Captain's Blog : Role of Vessel Traffic Services

Most Vessel Traffic Management systems around the world prefer to keep a low profile when it comes to making a positive contribution towards collision avoidance, the general view being that, when it comes to collision avoidance, all such manoeuvres are addressed by COLREGS and alert seafarers need only follow them to steer clear of potential close-quarter situations. VTS's could make a positive contribution towards safety by taking a pro-active role in resolving ambiguities between, say, several vessels converging simultaneously at the pilot ground. Some are known to allocate turn numbers to vessels in the order of approach usually when vessels have already jostled for space and one has established a clear 'lead' over the 'next in line'. VTS's need to consider establishing clear speed limits within a, say, 3-mile perimeter of the pilot-boarding ground when approaching from seaward.

A few congested and - at least in one case- chaotic, approaches to pilot-boarding grounds that one can recall easily are Chanjiang-kou (Shanghai), Ngan Chou (Hongkong), Uraga Pilot (Tokyo bay) and EPBG"A" (Singapore).

In Singapore, the situation is unique. Outward-bound from Brani/Keppel/Tanjong Pagar terminals, having found myself short on time to carry out an effective appraisal of approaching and/or through traffic in the straits, and with the VTS's role restricted to informing the shipmaster about location and movement of ALL targets, irrespective of the degree of threat, I have endeavoured to increase the safety envelope around own vessel by slowing down considerably prior disembarking pilot. This allows valuable time to process all targets and resolve potential tight situations.

Elsewhere, VTS operators could refrain from providing excessive, sometimes irrelevant, inputs which lead to information overload and distract the Bridge Team.

With increasing volumes of traffic - and ship speeds - transit through ultra-busy straits such as Dover and Singapore Straits have increasingly become an area of concern to the mariner. Some tanker-owners already stipulate speed limits and/or "no-overtaking" zones for the busiest sectors of the straits. Here again, imposing a mandatory maximum speed limit of 12- 14 knots in bottle-neck areas will reduce risks.

Responsibility of enforcing such a rule could be vested with the VTS.